Abstract-This paper considers finite-horizon optimal control for multi-agent systems subject to additive Gaussiandistributed stochastic disturbance and a chance constraint. The problem is particularly difficult when agents are coupled through a joint chance constraint, which limits the probability of constraint violation by any of the agents in the system. Although prior approaches [1][2] can solve such a problem in a centralized manner, scalability is an issue.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider multi-agent systems under unbounded stochastic uncertainty, with state and control constraints. Stochastic uncertainty with a probability distribution, such as Gaussian, is a more natural model for exogenous disturbances, such as wind gusts and turbulence [3] , than previously studied set-bounded models [4] [5] [6] [7] . An effective framework to address robustness with stochastic unbounded uncertainty is optimization with a chance constraint [8] . A chance constraint requires that the probability of violating the state constraints (i.e., the probability of failure) is below a user-specified bound known as the risk bound. A substantial body of work has studied the optimization problems with chance constraint mainly for single-agent systems [1] [2] [9] [10] [11] .
Users of multi-agent systems typically would like to bound the probability of system failure rather than the probabilities of individual agents' failure; in other words, we need to impose a joint chance constraint, which limits the probability This research is funded by Boeing Company grant MIT-BA-GTA-1 Masahiro Ono is a PhD student, MIT. hiro ono@mit.edu Brian C. Williams is a professor, MIT. williams@mit.edu of having at least one agent failing to satisfy any of its state constraints. In such cases agents are coupled through the joint chance constraint even if they are not coupled through state constraints. It is then an important challenge to find globally optimal control inputs for the multi-agent system in a decentralized manner while guaranteeing the satisfaction of the joint chance constraint. There has been past research on the decentralized optimal control problem with deterministic plant model [12] or with bounded uncertainty [13] . As far as we know, no past work has solved the decentralized optimization problem under stochastic unbounded uncertainty with a coupling through a joint chance constraint.
We solve the problem in the following two steps. Firstly, we find a set of decomposed individual chance constraints that is a sufficient condition of the original joint chance constraint. This decomposition allows us to convert chance constraints into deterministic constraints, though agents are still coupled through the constraint on the sum of individual risk bounds. The resulting optimization problem is deterministic and convex, so it can be solved in a centralized manner. Secondly, we formulate a set of decomposed optimization problems that are solved by individual agents in a distributed manner. The decomposed problems share a fixed value of a dual variable of the constraint that couples agents. In order to be optimal, the dual variable must be a solution to a rootfinding problem, which corresponds to the complementary slackness condition of the centralized optimization. The rootfinding problem is solved by a central module. The solution obtained by this decentralized approach, which we call the decentralized solution, is exactly the same as the globally optimal solution of the centralized formulation. Moreover, if the centralized optimization problem has an optimal solution, a decentralized solution is guaranteed to exist.
Our algorithm, Market-based Iterative Risk Allocation (MIRA), finds the optimal solution by solving the decomposed optimization problem and the root-finding problem iteratively and alternatively. Although the root-finding problem is solved by a centralized module, it typically uses less than 0.1% of the total computation time.
We offer an economic interpretation of our decentralized approach. The MIRA algorithm can be viewed as a computational market for risk, where the agents' demand is for risk, while the user supplies a fixed amount of risk by specifying the risk bound. The dual value can be interpreted as the price of risk. The demand of each agent at a given price is obtained by solving the decomposed optimization problem. The algorithm looks for the equilibrium price, at which the supply and the aggregate demand are balanced, by iteratively solving the root-finding problem. This process is analogous to the price adjustment process called tâtonnement or Walrasian auction in general equilibrium theory [14] . Past work by Voos [15] has presented successful applications of the tâtonnement approach to distributed resource allocation optimization problems.
The major contributions of this paper are: i) the decentralized formulation of a finite-horizon optimal control problem with a joint chance constraint, ii) the proof of existence and optimality of the decentralized solution, iii) the proof of the continuity and monotonicity of the demand function, and iv) the development of the MIRA algorithm, which is guaranteed to find the optimal solution whenever it exists.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The following notation is used throughout this paper: S : Risk bound given by the user of the system δ i n : Individual risk bound for the n'th constraint of the i'th agent x i t : State vector of the i'th agent at the t'th time step (random variable)
We assume that J i (·) is a proper convex function. N (µ, Σ) is a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance Σ. Although we focus on Gaussian-distributed uncertainty in this paper, our algorithm can be extended to any additive stochastic uncertainties with quasi-concave probability distribution.
Our model considers that the multi-agent system has failed when at least one agent fails to satisfy any of its state constraints. Therefore, the joint chance constraint (4) requires that the probability that all state constraints of all agents are satisfied must be more than 1 − S, where S is the upper bound of the probability of failure (risk bound). The risk bound is specified by the user of the system. We assume that 0 ≤ S ≤ 0.5 in order to guarantee the convexity of Problem 2 in Section III. This assumption is reasonable because acceptable risk of failure is much less than 50% in most practical cases. We assume no coupling through state constraints in this paper.
Given a risk bound S, the problem is to find the optimal control inputs U i for all agents that minimize the system cost
III. CENTRALIZED OPTIMIZATION This section presents the centralized solution to Problem 1. It is, practically speaking, impossible to solve Problem 1 directly, since the joint chance constraint (4) is very hard to evaluate due to the difficulty of computing an integral of multi-variable probability distribution over an arbitrary region. It is also difficult to handle random variables x i t as it is. Building upon past work [1] [16], we decompose the joint chance constraint into individual chance constraints that only involve single-dimensional distributions. Individual chance constraints can be turned into deterministic constraints defined on the nominal statex i t . As a result, we obtain the following approximated optimization problem that does not contain a joint chance constraint nor random variables:
Problem 2: Centralized optimization with decomposed chance constraints
Note that new decision variables δ 1:I 1:N i ≥ 0 are introduced. They represent the risk bounds of individual chance constraints (9), whose sum of the individual risk bounds is bounded by the original risk bound S in (10). We interpret δ 1:I 1:N i as risk allocation [17] : the total amount of risk S is allocated to each constraint, and the allocation is optimized in order to minimize the system cost.
In (9) , −m i n (·) is the inverse of cumulative distribution function of univariate Gaussian distribution:
where erf −1 is the inverse of the Gauss error function. Note that m (12) , together with (10) and δ n t ≥ 0, implies the original chance constraint (4) [16] :
This probabilistic state constraint (12) is equivalent to the deterministic constraint (9) in Problem 2 [8] . Therefore any solution that satisfies (9)-(10) also satisfies (4). Problem 2 has the following two important features: a) Convexity: Problem 2 is a convex optimization problem since m i n (δ i n ) is a convex function. Therefore, it can be solved by a convex optimization solver.
b) Small conservatism: Although the optimal solution of Problem 2 is not the optimal solution to Problem 1, our past work [1] [2] showed that the conservatism is significantly smaller than past bounding approaches such as [11][18] . This is explained by the fact that the probability of violating more than two constraints is smaller than the probability of violating just one constraint by orders of magnitude in many practical cases, where S ≪ 1.
Therefore, by solving Problem 2, we can obtain a feasible, close-optimal solution of Problem 1. Note that agents are still coupled through (10).
IV. DECENTRALIZED OPTIMIZATION
Although the centralized method presented in the previous section can solve Problem 2 optimally, its scalability is an issue.
We propose a decentralized formulation of Problem 2 through dual decomposition, where each agent solves a decomposed convex optimization problem in a distributed manner while a central module solves a root-finding problem. Although this method has a centralized part, its computation time is negligible compared to the decentralized part. This claim is empirically validated in Section VII.
A. The Approach
Each individual agent solves the following Problem 3, which involves a convex optimization: Problem 3: Decomposed optimization problem for i'th agent
where the constant p ≥ 0 is given by the central module and shared by all agents. We will show in Section VI that p can be interpreted as the price of risk. Problem 3 is completely decoupled from other agents, since it does not include the coupling constraint (10) . Note that
n , the total amount of risk the i'th agent takes, is not bounded. Instead, it penalizes the agent with a factor of p (13). Given p, each agent finds its optimal risk allocation δ i⋆ 1:N i (p). Since the total amount of risk that each agent takes is also a function of p, we denote it by
In Section IV-B, we will give a more formal definition of D i (p), and prove that it is a singlevalued, continuous, monotonically decreasing function. We will show in Section VI that D i (p) can be interpreted as the i'th agent's demand for risk given the price p.
The central module finds the optimal p by solving the following root-finding problem except in the case of p = 0:
Problem 4: Root-finding problem for the central module
The central module plays the role of the market of risk, which decides the price of risk. An important fact is that the computational complexity of solving Problem 4 is not affected by the number of agents, since the input to the rootfinding algorithm we use (Brent's method) is the difference of the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (17) .
The following proposition holds: Proposition 1: Optimality of decentralized solution Therefore we need to pay attention to the KKT conditions that are related to (10) and δ i n :
where µ i n and p are the dual variables corresponding to (9) and (10), respectively. The KKT conditions are the necessary and sufficient conditions for global optimality of Problem 2 since J i and m i n are convex functions, and the equality constraint (7) is linear. The optimal solution of Problem 3 (18) because it is also a part of the KKT conditions of Problem 3. In the case of (a), δ 1:I⋆ 1:N i satisfies (19) and (20) since p ⋆ is a root of (17) . In the case of (b), (19) and (20) 
Since the cost function of the centralized optimization (6) is a sum of the individual cost functions (13) and the constraints (7)-(9) are the same as (14)- (16), the partial derivatives of the Lagrangians of Problem 2 and 3 respect to U i and X i are the same. Therefore, their stationary constraints regarding to U i and X i are the same. Problem 2 and 3 also share the same primary feasibility, dual feasibility, and the complementary slackness conditions regarding to U i and X i since (7)- (9) and (14)- (16) Proposition 1 states that if a decentralized solution (i.e., solution for Problems 3 and 4) exists, then it is an optimal solution for the centralized problem (Problem 2). The following Proposition 2 guarantees the existence of a decentralized solution if there is an optimal solution for the centralized problem.
Proposition 2: Existence of decentralized solution
If Problem 2 has an optimal solution (U 1:I⋆ , δ
is an optimal solution of Problem 3 for all i = 1 · · · I with p = 0 and Σ
Proof: The KKT conditions of Problem 3 are the necessary and sufficient conditions for its optimality since J i and m i n are convex functions, and the equality constraint (14) is linear. Since the KKT conditions of Problem 3 are the subset of the KKT conditions of Problem 2, the optimal solution of Problem 2 always satisfies all KKT conditions of Problem 3 for all i = 1 · · · I; hence it is an optimal solution of Problem 3. When p > 0, it is a root of Problem 4 since the second term of (20) 
Although the following Lemma 2 is just a contraposition of Proposition 2, it is useful when checking the feasibility of Problem 2. 
B. Continuity and Monotonicity of Demand Function
Although the existence of a decentralized solution is established by Proposition 2, it does not tell how to find it. The objective of this subsection is to prove the continuity of the demand function D i (p) in order to guarantee that the root of Problem 4 can be found by a standard rootfinding algorithm, Brent's method. We will also prove in this subsection that D i (p) is a monotonically decreasing function. This feature is very important since it allows us to find the absence of a root by checking the feasibility conditions at the boundaries.
We first derive the optimal cost as a function of a risk bound. Observe that the following optimization problem gives the same solution as Problem 3:
Therefore, Problem 3 is equivalent to solving the following:
where
s.t. (14) − (16), (23) The conditions (14)- (16), (23) define a compact space. If it is non-empty, (25) has a minimum since J i (U i ) is a proper convex function by assumption. We denote by ∆ i min the smallest ∆ i that makes (14)- (16), (23) (14)- (16), (23) is convex, λU
2 is a feasible (but not necessarily optimal) solution of (25) with λ∆
The second inequality holds since
It immediately follows from Lemma 2 that J i⋆ (∆ i ) is continuous, and differentiable at all but countably many points.
We then prove the strict convexity for a portion of the domain of J i⋆ where it is strictly decreasing. We define
Slope: 
where ∂J i⋆ is the subdifferencial of J i⋆ . The inequality means that all subgradients are less than zero. See Fig. 1 for graphical interpretation. 
Lemma 4:
The second inequality follows from the mean-value theorem and the definition of ∆ i max . Note that by assumption, λ > 0 (hence, λ∆
As for the first inequality, refer to the proof of Lemma 3. It is implied by (27) that λU
is not a globally optimal solution; hence, it is not a local optimal solution either.
Therefore, there exists a non-zero perturbation δU i to λU 
is strictly convex and monotonically decreasing, there is a unique minimizer of (24) for p > 0. When p = 0, the optimal solution of (24) may not be unique.
Then, we define the demand function as follows so that D i (p) is a single-valued function for all p ≥ 0:
Definition: Demand function
This definition is natural since ∆ i max is an optimal solution for p = 0 if it exists. Moreover, in such a case, ∆ i max is the smallest optimal solution. This feature is important since we need to check the condition (19) , which is equivalent to Σ 
where ∂J i⋆ (∆ i ) is the subdifferential of J i⋆ . We first prove the continuity and monotonicity in
is the optimal solution for (24), the following optimality condition is satisfied:
It follows from the Conjugate Subgradient Theorem (Proposition 5.4.3 of [19] ) that
⋆ is differentiable everywhere, and hence continuously differentiable, in (p 
Then we show that
Since D i k satisfies the condition for optimality for p k ,
Hence, D(p) is continuous at p i min . In the same way, it is lower semi-continuous at p There is no feasible solution; terminate; 6: else 7: 
The central module announces p to agents; 9: Each agent computes D i (p) by solving Problem 3;
10:
Each agent submits D i (p) to the central module;
11:
The central module updates p by computing one step of Brent's method; 12: end while 13: 
C. Finding a root for Problem 4 (Algorithm 1, Line 7-12)
If the algorithm has not terminated in the previous steps, we have Σ
Therefore, the continuity of D i (p) (Proposition 3) guarantees that Brent's method can find a root between (0, max i p i max ]. Brent's method provides superliner rate of convergence [20] . It is suitable for our application since it does not require the derivative of D i (p), which is generally hard to obtain. In many practical cases, it is more efficient to incrementally search p that is large enough to make Σ Demand from Agent 1 Fig. 2 . Economic interpretation of the decentralized optimization approach in a system with two agents. Note that we followed the economics convention of placing the price on the vertical axis. The equilibrium price is p ⋆ , and the optimal risk allocation is
it can be solved efficiently using interior-point methods. The central module collects D i (p) from all agents (Line 10) and updates p by computing one step of Brent's method (Line 11).
The communication requirements between agents are small: in each iteration, each agent receives p (Line 8) and transmits D i (p) (Line 10), both of which are scalars. The central module can be removed by letting all individual agents solve Problem 4 to update p simultaneously. However, since the computation of p is duplicated among the agents, there is no advantage of doing so in terms of computation time.
VI. ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION
The economic interpretation of the distributed optimization becomes clear by regarding the dual variable p as the price of risk.
Each agent takes risk ∆ i n by paying p∆ i n as an additional cost (see (13) or (24)). It optimizes the amount of risk it wants to take D(p), as well as the control sequence U i , by solving Problem 3 with a given price of risk p. Therefore D i (p) can be interpreted as the demand for risk of the i'th agent. On the other hand, the upper bound on the total amount of risk S, which is a constant specified by the user of the system, can be interpreted as the supply of risk.
The optimal price p ⋆ must satisfy the complementary slackness condition (20) . In the usual case where the optimal price is positive p ⋆ > 0, the aggregate demand i D i (p ⋆ ) must be equal to the supply S at p ⋆ . Such a price is called the equilibrium price. In a special case where the supply always exceeds the demand for all p ≥ 0, the optimal price is zero p ⋆ = 0. If the aggregate demand always exceeds the supply for all p ≥ 0, there is no solution that satisfies the primal feasibility condition (19) , and hence the problem is infeasible. See Fig. 2 for the graphical interpretation.
The iterative optimization process of MIRA is analogous to the price adjustment process called tâtonnement or Walrasian auction in the general equilibrium theory [14] . Intuitively, the price is raised when there is excess demand
and it is lowered when there is excess supply i D i (p) − S < 0 until the supply and the aggregate demand are balanced.
VII. SIMULATION
A. Result  Fig. 3 shows the average computation times of 100 runs of the MIRA algorithm with 2 to 128 agents, compared against the centralized approach that directly solves Problem 2. Demands for risk are computed parallelly in each agent.
The computation time of the centralized algorithm quickly grows as the problem size increases. Although MIRA, the proposed algorithm, is slower for the problems with less than eight agents, it outperforms the centralized algorithm when the number of agents is more than eight. The exponential fits to the average computation time of MIRA and the centralized approach are 15.2e 0.0160n and 0.886e 0.328n , respectively, where n is the number of agents. MIRA has a 20 times smaller exponent than the centralized approach, which means a significant improvement in scalability.
A counterintuitive phenomenon observed in the result is that MIRA also slow down for large problems, although not as significantly as the centralized algorithm. This is because iterations must be synchronized among all agents. When each agent computes its demand for risk by solving the nonlinear optimization problem, the computation time diverges from agent to agent. In each iteration, all agents must wait until the slowest agent finishes computing its demand. As a result, MIRA slows down for large problems, as the expected computation time of the slowest agent grows. Our future work is to develop an asynchronous algorithm to improve scalability.
The computation time of the central module (CM), which is shown in Figure 4 , is at most 0.1% of the total computation time of MIRA. Figure 4 also shows that the number of iterations are almost constant. Moreover, the computational complexity of the root finding algorithm used for the CM does not increase with the number of agents. As a result, the computation time of the CM (Figure 4 ) grows less significantly than the computation time of the entire algorithm ( Figure 4) . Therefore, the existence of the central module does not harm the scalability of MIRA. The growth in the computation time of the CM is mainly due to computational overhead of handling the data from multiple agents.
B. Implementation and Setting
In the decentralized approach (MIRA), a convex optimization solver SNOPT is used to solve Problem 3 (computation of D i (p)), and the Matlab implementation of Brent's method (fzero) is used to find the root p ⋆ of Problem 4. In the centralized approach, Problem 2 is solved by SNOPT. Since it is hard to set exactly the same optimality tolerances for centralized and decentralized approaches, we set a stricter tolerance for the decentralized approach than the centralized approach. Specifically, the optimality tolerance of SNOPT is defined in terms of the complementary slackness normalized by dual variables Plotted values are the average of 100 runs with randomly generated constraints. Note that plot is in log-log scale. set the tolerance of fzero as
This tolerance is stricter than the previous one since p/ π ≤ 1. We set ǫ = 10 −6 . Simulations were conducted on a machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU clocked at 2.67 GHz and 8GB RAM. MIRA is simulated by a single processor; however, we counted the computation time of the agent that is slowest to compute the demand in each iteration, so that the result shown in Fig. 3 corresponds to the computation time when running MIRA with parallel computing. Communication delay is not simulated in our result.
C. Parameters used
The planning window is 1 ≤ t ≤ 5. The Parameters are set as follows: 
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented a decentralized approach to a finite-horizon optimal control problem with a joint chance constraint, where each agent solves a decomposed convex optimization problem (Problem 3) in a distributed manner while a central module solves a root-finding problem (Problem 4). The proofs of the existence and optimality of the decentralized solution (Propositions 1 and 2) , as well as the continuity and monotonicity of the demand function (Proposition 3), were given. We developed the Market-based Iterative Risk Allocation (MIRA) algorithm, which is guaranteed to find the optimal solution whenever it exists. The empirical results demonstrated a significant improvement in scalability compared to the centralized algorithm.
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